Neal Crispin v. Commissioner of Internal Reven by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-25-2013 
Neal Crispin v. Commissioner of Internal Reven 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Neal Crispin v. Commissioner of Internal Reven" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1173. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1173 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2275 
_____________ 
 
NEAL CRISPIN, 
                              Appellant 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
     
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
(No. 28980-07) 
Judge:  Hon. Diane L. Kroupa 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
January 8, 2013 
 
Before:   RENDELL, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 25, 2013) 
_______________ 
 
 2 
 
George W. Connelly    [ARGUED] 
Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & Williams 
1200 Smith Street 
1400 Citicorp 
Houston, TX   77002 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Gary R. Allen 
Tamara W. Ashford 
Richard Farber 
Judith A. Hagley   [ARGUED] 
Gilbert S. Rothenberg 
United States Department of Justice 
Tax Division 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
P.O. Box 502 
Washington, DC   20044 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Neal D. Crispin appeals the decision of the United 
States Tax Court that he was not entitled to an ordinary loss 
deduction for his participation in a Custom Adjustable Rate 
Debt Structure (“CARDS”) transaction and that he is liable 
for an accuracy-related penalty under § 6662 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).1  The Tax Court disallowed the 
                                              
1
 All references to the I.R.C. correspond to sections of 
Title 26 of the United States Code (2001). 
 3 
 
claimed loss on the grounds that Crispin‟s CARDS 
transaction lacked economic substance and held that he could 
not avoid the penalty because he had not relied reasonably or 
in good faith on the advice of an independent and qualified 
tax professional.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Facts 
 
 Crispin is a businessman who has engaged in various 
enterprises over the years, some through his wholly-owned S-
corporation, Murus Equities, Inc. (“Murus”).  Among other 
things, he has been involved in leasing, structured finance, 
aircraft acquisition, and mortgage-backed securities investing.  
He practiced as a certified public accountant and served as 
chief financial officer of an energy company, before pursuing 
opportunities in structured finance and aircraft leasing.  
Crispin has had long and varied experience with tax matters, 
including tax shelters.   
 
 Since 1989, Crispin has been in the business of 
purchasing and leasing commercial turboprop aircraft through 
investment syndicates.  According to Crispin, his aircraft 
leasing business purchases used aircraft costing between $1 
million and $10 million and leases them for approximately 
ten years before reselling them.  Prior to his participation in 
the CARDS transaction that is the subject of this appeal,  
Crispin had identified three aircraft (the “Aircraft”) that he 
expected would be available for purchase in 2002 and that he 
says he planned to have Murus purchase.
2
 
                                              
2
 Crispin conducted his aircraft leasing business 
 4 
 
 A CARDS transaction is a tax-avoidance scheme that 
was widely marketed to wealthy individuals during the 
1990‟s and early 2000‟s.  It purports to generate, through a 
series of pre-arranged steps, large “paper” losses deductible 
from ordinary income.  First, a tax-indifferent party, such as a 
foreign entity not subject to United States taxation, borrows 
foreign currency from a foreign bank (a “CARDS Loan”).  
Then, a United States taxpayer purchases a small amount, 
such as 15 percent, of the borrowed foreign currency by 
assuming liability for a an equal amount of the CARDS Loan.  
The taxpayer also agrees to be jointly liable with the foreign 
borrower for the remainder of the CARDS Loan and so the 
taxpayer purports to establish a basis equal to the entire 
borrowed amount.
3
  Finally, the taxpayer exchanges the 
                                                                                                     
through a separate company, AeroCentury Corp., of which he 
was the chairman and chief executive officer.  It is unclear 
from the record whether Crispin had previously used Murus 
to engage in aircraft leasing.   
3
 The Commissioner contends that that step in the 
CARDS transaction “is predicated on an invalid application 
of the ... basis provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” 
(Appellee‟s Br. at 4.)  Specifically, I.R.C. § 1012 provides 
that a taxpayer‟s basis in property is generally equal to the 
purchase price paid by the taxpayer.  That purchase price 
includes the amount of the seller‟s liabilities assumed by the 
taxpayer as part of the purchase, on the assumption that the 
taxpayer will eventually repay those liabilities.  See Comm’r 
v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1983) (noting that a loan must 
be recourse to the taxpayer to be included in basis).  But in a 
CARDS transaction, the Commissioner argues, the taxpayer 
and the foreign borrower agree that the taxpayer will repay 
only the portion of the loan equal to the amount of currency 
 5 
 
foreign currency he purchased for United States dollars.  That 
exchange is a taxable event, and the taxpayer claims a loss 
equal to the full amount of his supposed basis in the CARDS 
Loan, less the proceeds of the relatively small amount of 
currency actually exchanged.  The taxpayer uses that loss to 
shelter unrelated income.
4
   
 
 CARDS marketing materials describe the transaction 
as providing “financing” to the taxpayer.  However, there is 
no net cash available to the taxpayer, because the foreign 
bank requires that all of the currency purchased with the 
proceeds of the CARDS Loan (including the portion 
purchased by the taxpayer) remain at the bank as collateral 
for the CARDS Loan.  The taxpayer only has access to the 
proceeds of the CARDS Loan if he delivers to the bank an 
equal amount of cash, cash equivalents, or other collateral 
acceptable to the bank.   
 
 In 2000, prior to the events involved in this case, the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) warned taxpayers about 
taking tax deductions based on artificial losses generated by 
inflated bases in certain assets.  See Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 
C.B. 255 (Aug. 13, 2000) (“Tax Avoidance Using Artificially 
High Basis”).  The Notice containing that warning said that 
the IRS would not recognize transactions that created an 
artificially high basis if they lacked economic substance or a 
valid business purpose.  After the IRS discovered the 
                                                                                                     
the taxpayer actually purchases.   
4
 The general structure of a CARDS transaction is well 
and thoroughly set forth in Gustashaw v. Commissioner, 696 
F.3d 1124, 1127-28, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 2012).   
 6 
 
widespread use of CARDS, and before Crispin had filed the 
tax return at issue in this case, the IRS issued another Notice 
specifically addressed to CARDS transactions and explaining 
their technical flaws.  See Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730 
(Mar. 18, 2002) (“Tax Avoidance Using Inflated Basis”).  
The IRS also imposed disclosure obligations on CARDS 
promoters and users.  Eventually, the IRS announced a 
settlement initiative that allowed CARDS users to avoid 
penalties for gross valuation misstatements applicable under 
I.R.C. § 6662, provided that they conceded their CARDS-
related tax benefits and agreed to pay a reduced penalty.  See 
Announcement 2005-80, 2005-2 C.B. 967 (Oct. 28, 2005).  
Some 2,000 taxpayers elected to settle, paying roughly $2 
billion in back taxes.   
 
The CARDS transaction at issue in this case was used 
by Crispin to shelter more than $7 million of income for the 
2001 tax year.  He learned of the CARDS opportunity from 
Roy Hahn, the founder of Chenery Associates, Inc. 
(“Chenery”), which promoted CARDS and other tax shelter 
transactions.  Crispin claims that Hahn approached him at a 
time when he (Crispin) planned to have Murus acquire the 
Aircraft but had not yet arranged financing for that purchase.  
Hahn proposed to Crispin that he enter into a CARDS 
transaction that Chenery had designed for another client who 
had decided not to proceed.  In that transaction, a foreign 
entity would enter into a 30-year CARDS Loan denominated 
in a Swiss francs; the loan proceeds would be retained by the 
lender; Crispin would purchase 15 percent of the foreign 
currency obtained through the CARDS Loan, and he would 
agree to be jointly and severally liable for the entire CARDS 
Loan; he would agree to repay the principal at the maturity 
date; and he would exchange the foreign currency he 
 7 
 
purchased for United States dollars, claiming as his basis the 
full amount of the CARDS Loan and garnering a tax loss 
equal to 85 percent of the total loan value.  Hahn also 
provided Crispin with a sample tax opinion blessing the 
transaction.
5
  
 
Crispin decided to proceed with the transaction.  He 
also informed his partner in the mortgage securities business 
about the CARDS transaction, and the partner agreed to 
participate as well, with Murus taking a one-third share equal 
to Crispin‟s share in that business, and the partner taking the 
remaining two-thirds.  Crispin advised Chenery that Murus 
would realize $7.6 million in income in 2001 from the 
mortgage securities business, and the transaction that Chenery 
                                              
5
  Crispin claims that the CARDS transaction proposed 
to him had attractive characteristics beyond the tax benefits.  
He says that the terms of the loan were already negotiated and 
documented, the loan was available at a time when new loans 
for the aviation industry were scarce, and the interest rate on 
the loan was tied to a Swiss benchmark rate that was lower 
than other comparable interest rates.  He also says that,  
although only cash and cash equivalents were acceptable as 
collateral for the proposed CARDS Loan, he anticipated 
being able to substitute the Aircraft for cash as collateral after 
the expected purchase of those planes in 2002.  Crispin also 
claims that he spoke with a representative of the proposed 
lender who said that aircraft would be favorably considered in 
place of cash as collateral for the CARDS Loan, although the 
collateral substitution would have to be approved by the 
bank‟s credit committee. 
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designed generated losses that were almost exactly equal to 
both partners‟ 2001 income from that business.6   
 
Chenery arranged the CARDS transaction with 
Croxley Financial Trading LLC (“Croxley”) serving as the 
foreign borrower
7
 and Zurich Bank and its affiliates 
(collectively “Zurich”) as the lender.  In early December 
2001, Zurich loaned 74 million Swiss francs to Croxley for a 
stated 30-year term but callable and repayable at any time 
after the first year.  The proceeds of the CARDS Loan were 
                                              
6
 Crispin again emphasizes that his CARDS 
transaction had already been designed for another Chenery 
client who had decided not to proceed, and that he “never 
requested a specific „loss‟ deduction from Chenery.”  
(Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 10.)  He further asserts that he 
offered his partner a two-thirds participation in the transaction 
because he was only able to utilize one-third of the CARDS 
Loan that had already been arranged by Chenery its other 
client.   However, there is no evidence in the record that the 
amount of the CARDS Loan, or any of the other amounts 
involved in the transaction, were fixed prior to the decision by 
Crispin and his partner to proceed.   
7
 Croxley is a Delaware limited liability company with 
executive offices in the Cayman Islands.  Its sole member is 
Dextra Bank & Trust Co. Ltd., a private bank organized under 
the laws of the Cayman Islands.  For U.S. tax purposes, a 
single-member limited liability company is disregarded as an 
entity separate from its owner.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(1)(ii).  Consequently, Dextra Bank, through Croxley, 
functioned as the foreign borrower in Crispin‟s CARDS 
transaction. 
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transferred to Croxley‟s account at Zurich and pledged to 
Zurich as collateral for the loan.  In late December 2001, 
Croxley sold Crispin 4.8 million Swiss francs (the “loan 
assumption proceeds”) in exchange for Crispin‟s agreement 
to be jointly and severally liable for a share of Croxley‟s loan 
obligations to Zurich with a value of $9.4 million.
8
  Crispin 
immediately transferred the loan assumption proceeds to the 
Zurich account of Murus, which in turn guaranteed Crispin‟s 
loan obligations, and which pledged the Swiss francs to 
Zurich as collateral for the loan.  On the same day, Murus 
exchanged 3.1 million Swiss francs for United States dollars.  
Murus received $1.8 million, which it used to purchase a 
Zurich promissory note that matured at the end of one year 
and that was held by Zurich as collateral for Murus‟s 
guaranty of Crispin‟s obligations on the CARDS Loan.9   
                                              
8
 At the time of the transaction, the exchange rate was 
approximately 1.7 Swiss francs per 1 U.S. dollar.  (See 
Supplemental App. at 136 (noting the exchange rate as 0.59 
U.S. dollars per 1 Swiss franc).)   
As discussed above, a CARDS transaction effectively 
involves two separate agreements by the U.S. taxpayer with 
respect to the CARDS Loan – the first in which the taxpayer 
agrees to assume a share of the loan in conjunction with the 
purchase of a relatively small percentage of the foreign 
currency obtained by the foreign borrower, and the second in 
which the taxpayer agrees to be jointly and severally liable 
for the entire CARDS Loan to establish his full basis in that 
loan.   
9
 Crispin says that “aircraft industry transactions are 
conducted in the [sic] U.S. Dollars, so the conversion of 
Swiss Francs to U.S. dollars was a business necessity” 
(Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 10), and that the amount of Swiss 
 10 
 
In August 2002, Zurich notified Croxley and Crispin 
that it was exercising its right to terminate the CARDS Loan.  
The collateral securing Murus‟s guarantee was transferred to 
Croxley, which used it, together with the remainder of the 
loan proceeds held by Zurich, to repay the loan.  The Croxley 
loan ended up lasting approximately one year, which was 
typical of the CARDS Loans that Zurich provided to Chenery 
clients.
10
   
 
 In April 2002, prior to filing his and Murus‟s 2001 tax 
returns, Crispin engaged Pullman & Comley, LLC 
(“Pullman”), a law firm that provided opinion letters for other 
Chenery clients, to provide a tax opinion regarding the 
CARDS transaction (the “Pullman Opinion”).  The Pullman 
Opinion noted that the IRS had expressed negative views of 
the economic substance and other aspects of CARDS 
transactions.  However, Pullman opined that Crispin‟s 
transaction “should have sufficient business purpose to be 
respected” by the IRS because “[t]he business purpose for 
[his] entering into the [t]ransactions is clear” and “[t]he 
financing available to [him] through the [t]ransactions has 
reduced [his] costs and has afforded [him] the ability to have 
                                                                                                     
francs that he purchased, when converted into U.S. dollars, 
“was the amount of financing need to acquire the Aircraft.”  
(Id. at 9).  There is no evidence in the record as to the 
proposed purchase price of the Aircraft.   
10
 It was also typical of CARDS transactions Chenery 
engineered with another financial institution.  See Gustashaw, 
696 F.3d at 1131-32 (discussing the one-year actual duration 
of the CARDS loan provided in that case by a German bank 
that had participated in other Chenery CARDS transactions).  
 11 
 
access to large amounts of capital on a long-term basis to 
operate the business of Murus.”  (Supplemental App. at 87.)   
 
Murus listed a loss of $7.6 million on its 2001 tax 
return, the difference between its claimed basis (equal to 
Crispin‟s $9.4 million assumed share of the CARDS Loan, 
guaranteed by Murus) and the $1.8 million of proceeds it 
received from the currency exchange.
11
   That loss offset 
virtually all of Murus‟s income for 2001. As a result, Crispin 
reported only $3,244 of flow-through income from Murus on 
his personal income tax return for 2001.
12
  
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
  After the IRS discovered Crispin‟s CARDS 
transaction, the Commissioner disallowed the $7.6 million 
ordinary loss deduction that Murus had taken.  In July 2007, 
the Commissioner sent Crispin a notice of deficiency for the 
2001 tax year that required payment of an additional $3.1 
                                              
11
 Before he filed his 2001 tax return, Crispin was 
advised by Chenery of an IRS program that would have 
allowed him to avoid penalties if he voluntarily disclosed his 
participation in a CARDS transaction.  Crispin chose not to 
do so.   
12
 Murus, as an S-corporation, is a “flow-through” 
entity for tax purposes, pursuant I.R.C. § 1361.  See United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 576 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (noting that the shareholders of a “„flow-through‟ 
Subchapter S Corporation” are required to include their share 
of the company‟s income, deductions, losses and credits in 
their personal income tax returns).    
 12 
 
million of taxes and a $1.2 million penalty.  Crispin filed a 
timely appeal with the Tax Court for a redetermination of his 
2001 taxes.   
 
 In March 2012, the Tax Court issued a memorandum 
opinion affirming the Commissioner‟s determination that 
Crispin was not entitled to an ordinary loss deduction from 
his participation in the CARDS transaction and that he was 
liable for the accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. § 6662. 
The Court found that the CARDS transaction lacked 
economic substance because Crispin had no valid business 
purpose and had tax-avoidance as his primary motivation.
13
  
It further held that Crispin was liable for a 40 percent penalty 
for underpayment that results from a gross valuation 
misstatement, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1), and that 
Crispin was not entitled to relief from the penalty under the 
exception applicable to taxpayers who rely on expert tax 
advice reasonably and in good faith, pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 6664(c)(1).   
 
  This timely appeal followed.   
                                              
13
 The Tax Court‟s decision that Crispin‟s CARDS 
transaction lacked economic substance is consistent with that 
Court‟s other CARDS cases, all of which have disallowed 
deductions associated with those transactions.  See Kipnis v. 
Comm’r, Nos. 30370-07, 30373-07, 2012 WL 5371787 (U.S. 
Tax Ct. 2012);  Gustashaw v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 
161 (2011), aff’d, 696 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2012); Kerman v. 
Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011), appeal pending, 
No. 11-1822 (6th Cir.); Country Pine Fin., LLC v. Comm’r, 
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (2009). 
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II. Discussion
14
 
 
 “While we conduct plenary review of the Tax Court‟s 
legal conclusions, we review its factual findings, including its 
ultimate finding as to the economic substance of a 
transaction, for clear error.”  ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 
F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998).  “[T]he Commissioner‟s 
deficiency determination is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and ... the burden of production as well as the 
ultimate burden of persuasion is placed on the taxpayer.”  
Anastasato v. Comm’r, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
 Crispin argues that the Tax Court erred when it 
disallowed the deduction that Murus claimed based on the 
CARDS transaction and thus held him liable for a deficiency 
for the 2001 tax year.  He also contends that, even if he is 
liable for the deficiency, the Tax Court erred when it upheld 
the Commissioner‟s imposition of the accuracy related 
penalty under I.R.C. § 6662.  We address each of those 
contentions in turn. 
 
                                              
14
 Because Crispin resided in the United States Virgin 
Islands when he filed his petition for review by the Tax 
Court, the Court noted that an appeal in Crispin‟s case would 
lie in this Circuit, and then followed our law in reaching its 
decision.  Crispin sought review by the Tax Court pursuant to 
I.R.C. §§ 6211, 6212.  We have jurisdiction under I.R.C. 
§ 7482(a)(1).   
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 A. The Liability Decision 
 
 Crispin argues that the Tax Court erred in determining 
that his CARDS transaction lacked economic substance 
because the Court misapplied the pertinent analytical test and 
failed to credit testimony that Crispin had a valid business 
purpose in using the CARDS Loan.  In particular, Crispin 
alleges that the business purpose of the CARDS Loan was to 
provide long-term financing for the purchase of aircraft to be 
used in Murus‟s leasing business.     
 
 Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any loss 
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by 
insurance or otherwise.”  I.R.C. § 165(a).  However, “[o]nly a 
bona fide loss is allowable.  Substance and not mere form 
shall govern in determining a deductible loss.”  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.165-1(b).   For a loss to be bona fide, it must therefore 
satisfy the economic substance doctrine, among other 
requirements.
15
  “The economic substance doctrine ... applies 
where the economic or business purpose of a transaction is 
relatively insignificant in relation to the comparatively large 
                                              
15
 The Commissioner has also questioned the 
deductibility of Crispin‟s CARDS loss under several other 
provisions of the Code, including whether the loss from a 
currency transaction was ordinary or capital, under I.R.C. 
§ 988, and whether Crispin was “at risk” for the amount of 
the deducted loss, as required by I.R.C. § 465.  Because the 
Tax Court did not address those arguments, and because we 
agree that Crispin‟s CARDS transaction fails to satisfy the 
economic substance doctrine, we do not address the 
Commissioner‟s other arguments.    
 15 
 
tax benefits that accrue (that is, a transaction ... which 
exploit[s] a feature of the tax code without any attendant 
economic risk) ... .”  Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 
299 F.3d 221, 231 n.12 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[I]n that situation, where the 
transaction was an attempted tax shelter devoid of legitimate 
economic substance, the doctrine governs to deny those 
benefits.”  Id.  
 
 “The inquiry into whether the taxpayer‟s transactions 
had sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax 
purposes turns on both the objective economic substance of 
the transactions and the subjective business motivation behind 
them.”  ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indicia of objective 
economic substance include whether the loss claimed was 
real or artificial,  Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 
608 F.3d 1366, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010), whether the transaction 
was “part of a prepackaged strategy marketed to shelter 
taxable gain,” id. at 1379, and “whether the transaction has 
any practicable economic effects other than the creation of 
income tax losses,” Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 
(2d Cir. 1990).  The subjective intent inquiry focuses on 
whether the taxpayer entered into the transaction intended  to 
serve a useful business purpose, see ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 
252-54; Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1991), 
and on the “correlation of losses to tax needs coupled with a 
general indifference to, or absence of, economic profits,” 
Keeler v. Comm’r, 243 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 
 The Tax Court found that Crispin‟s CARDS 
transaction failed both the objective and subjective tests for 
economic substance.  The Court noted that Crispin 
 16 
 
experienced only a paper loss of $7.6 million,
16
 and that, after 
the CARDS Loan was repaid, Crispin experienced no 
consequences other than receiving the tax deduction.  As a 
result, the Court concluded that “[t]he ordinary loss claimed 
from the CARDS transaction was fictional” (App. at 27), 
which it noted was “the hallmark of a transaction lacking 
economic substance.”  (Id. at 28.)   
 
 As to Crispin‟s stated business purpose, the Tax Court 
determined that both the structure of the CARDS transaction 
and the record belie Crispin‟s contention that he engaged in 
the transaction to obtain long-term financing for use in his 
aircraft leasing business.  Although the Zurich loan had a 
stated 30-year maturity, the proceeds remained in Zurich‟s 
complete possession and control as collateral for the loan, and 
Zurich had the ability to call the loan at any time after the first 
year, which it in fact did.  Also, Crispin never took any action 
to obtain and use the proceeds of the loan, knowing that he 
would have to post an offsetting amount of cash collateral.  
Nor did he ever take any steps to secure Zurich‟s approval to 
substitute aircraft for cash as collateral for the loan.  Finally, 
there was no potential for profit, because the interest rate 
charged on the CARDS Loan was greater than the interest 
paid on the proceeds deposited as collateral at Zurich.  Based 
on the foregoing, all of which is well-supported by the record, 
we see no error, let alone clear error, in the Tax Court‟s 
                                              
16
 The Tax Court noted that the true net cost of the 
CARDS transaction to Crispin was only $72,926, primarily 
the structuring fee paid to Chenery and the cost of the 
Pullman Opinion.  The ordinary loss actually reported by 
Murus, by comparison, was $7,641,706. 
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ultimate finding that Crispin‟s CARDS transaction lacked 
economic substance. 
 
 Crispin objects to the Tax Court‟s conclusion that 
much of his testimony on the business purpose of his CARDS 
transaction was not credible.  In particular, the Court 
discounted his testimony that he had approached Zurich about 
substituting aircraft for cash as collateral for the CARDS 
Loan, and that he had received assurances from Zurich that it 
would consider such a change.  Evidently that testimony – as 
well as expert testimony regarding the potential profit that 
could be generated by using the CARDS Loan proceeds to 
purchase aircraft – were unimpressive, because the Court 
found that Crispin did not actually plan to pursue the 
substitution of collateral.  Crispin‟s protestations of 
unfairness in that finding ring hollow.   Assessing whether 
“taxpayers‟ fact witnesses testified incredibly with regard to 
material aspects of th[e] case, and that their testimony ... was 
self-serving, vague, elusive, uncorroborated, and/or 
inconsistent with documentary and other reliable evidence” 
constitutes the kind of “credibility determinations  ... 
ensconced firmly within the province of a trial court, afforded 
broad deference on appeal.”  Neonatology Assocs., 299 F.3d 
at 229 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In this case, 
there was ample documentary and testimonial evidence that 
contradicted Crispin‟s account of the business purpose of his 
CARDS transaction, and the Tax Court did not abuse its 
discretion in deciding not to credit Crispin‟s evidence. 
 
 B. The Penalty Decision 
 
 Crispin argues that, even if we affirm the 
Commissioner‟s disallowance of the deduction that he took 
 18 
 
based on his CARDS transaction loss, he ought not be liable 
for the gross valuation misstatement penalty.  He contends 
that “[t]he overvaluation penalty should only be applicable 
where there is an underpayment attributable to an inflated 
value of an asset within the meaning of the penalty,” and that 
the Tax Court failed to make the requisite finding as to how 
he had improperly inflated, i.e., overstated, the value of the 
asset claimed in his 2001 tax return.  (Appellant‟s Opening 
Br. at 56 (citing Todd v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 
1988), and Gainer v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 
1990); Reply at 19.)  Crispin also contends that, even if the 
valuation misstatement penalty would normally apply, he is 
entitled to relief because he relied in good faith on the 
Pullman Opinion.  Both of those arguments fail. 
 
1. Applicability of the Valuation 
 Misstatement Penalty 
 
 Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a 
20 percent penalty with respect to underpayment that results 
from a “substantial valuation misstatement,” which includes a 
misstatement of “basis” if “the adjusted basis of any 
property[] claimed on any return of tax imposed by chapter 1 
is 200 percent or more of the amount determined to be the 
correct amount of such . . . adjusted basis.”17  I.R.C. 
                                              
17
 With exceptions not relevant in this case, “[t]he 
basis of property shall be the cost of such property ... .” I.R.C. 
§ 1012(a).  Typically, the “cost” of an asset “is equal to the 
cost to the taxpayer of acquiring the asset.”  Muserlain v. 
Comm’r, 932 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Parsons 
v. United States, 227 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1955) (noting 
that “cost to the taxpayer [is] represented by the taxpayer‟s 
 19 
 
§ 6662(b)(1)-(3), (e)(1)(A).  That section goes on to increase 
the penalty to 40 percent if the taxpayer claims an adjusted 
basis in the property that is 400 percent or more of the correct 
amount; this is known as a “gross valuation misstatement.”  
Id. § 6662(h).  We have held that, “where a claimed tax 
benefit is disallowed because it is an integral part of a 
transaction lacking economic substance, the imposition of the 
valuation overstatement penalty is properly imposed ... .”  
Merino v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).18    
                                                                                                     
outlay” (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra note 3 
(recognizing that the taxpayer‟s acquisition cost can under 
certain circumstances include the seller‟s liabilities). 
18
 Our sister circuits are divided as to whether the 
valuation misstatement penalty applies to tax deductions that 
have been totally disallowed under the economic substance 
doctrine.  Compare Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, 
LLC v. United States, 661 F.3d 667, 671-75 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the penalty is applicable), Zfass v. Comm’r, 118 
F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 1997) (same), Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 
F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1991) (same), and Massengill v. 
Comm’r, 876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), with 
Heasley v. Comm’r, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that when the IRS totally disallows a deduction, the 
underpayment is “not attributable to a valuation 
overstatement” but rather to claiming an improper deduction), 
Gainer v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), 
and Todd v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that the penalty was inapplicable when the 
deficiency was not due to overstated basis but to a failure to 
place property into service).  However, Crispin‟s reliance on 
Todd and Gainer is misplaced because they do not state the 
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law of this Circuit.  See Merino v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 147, 
157-159 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the valuation 
misstatement penalty applies to property acquired in a 
transaction found to lack economic substance and expressly 
declining to follow Todd and Heasley). 
Our reasoning as to the applicability of the valuation 
misstatement penalty finds support in the recent decision of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Gustashaw, supra. In that case, the taxpayer conceded the tax 
deficiency that the Commissioner had assessed as a result of 
the disallowance of a CARDS Loan loss, so the economic 
substance issue was not before the Court, but the taxpayer 
contested the penalties.  Applying the “majority rule,” the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the 40 percent penalty applies 
“even if the deduction is totally disallowed because the 
underlying transaction, which is intertwined with the 
overvaluation misstatement, lacked economic substance.” 696 
F.3d at 1136.  Also, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits “have 
questioned the wisdom of their positions” in Todd, Heasley, 
and Gainer because those positions create the “anomalous 
result” of relieving a taxpayer of the penalty when a 
deduction is disallowed because it is so egregious that it is 
improper for a reason other than valuation, such as a lack of 
economic substance,  See Bemont Investments, L.L.C. ex rel. 
Tax Matters Partner v. United States, 679 F.3d 339, 355 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (Prado, J., concurring) (noting that the 
“Todd/Heasley rule,” by “[a]mplifying the egregiousness of 
the scheme – to the point where the transaction is an utter 
sham – could ... , perversely, shield the taxpayer from liability 
for overvaluation”); Keller v. Comm’r., 556 F.3d 1056, 1061 
(9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the rule as expressed in most 
Circuits, including Merino, is a “sensible method of resolving 
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In this case, it is not entirely clear how the Tax Court 
determined the correct basis of the “asset” at issue, namely 
the “loan assumption proceeds” (App. at 27), even though it 
did conclude that Crispin made a gross valuation 
misstatement when he claimed $9.4 million in adjusted basis 
for that asset on his 2001 tax return.  There are two ways one 
might think about a basis determination and the consequent 
amount of a valuation overstatement in a CARDS transaction, 
both of which provide grounds for affirmance.  Cf. ACM 
P’ship, 157 F.3d at 249 n.33 (noting that a court of appeals 
may affirm a decision of the Tax Court on any grounds 
supported by the record, regardless of the Tax Court‟s 
rationale).   
 
One way is to take the entire CARDS Loan for which 
the taxpayer agreed to be jointly and severally liable ($9.4 
million in Crispin‟s case) and ask what it cost the taxpayer to 
enter into that loan.  That cost, which may be viewed as 
representing the taxpayer‟s basis, see supra note 17, can 
rightly be seen in the CARDS context as limited to the value 
of the foreign currency actually purchased by the taxpayer 
and exchanged for U.S. dollars ($1.8 million here).
19
  The 
                                                                                                     
overvaluation cases” because it “cuts off at the pass what 
might seem to be an anomalous result – allowing a party to 
avoid tax penalties by engaging in behavior one might 
suppose would implicate more tax penalties, not fewer[,]” but 
acknowledging that, “[n]onetheless, in this circuit we are 
constrained by Gainer”). 
 
19
 The $1.8 million also represents the fair market 
value of the asset (i.e., the foreign currency) that Crispin 
actually purchased in his CARDS transaction.  The basis in 
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amount of the valuation misstatement is thus the difference 
between the basis that Murus claimed on its 2001 tax return 
and that cost.  (The difference is the $7.6 million deduction 
claimed by Murus and disallowed by the Commissioner, 
resulting in an equivalent upward adjustment in Crispin‟s 
taxable income.)  Cf. Merino, 196 F.3d at 151 (noting that the 
parties had stipulated that the fair market value of the asset 
(which the Court appears to have used as a proxy for cost 
basis) was less than $50,000).    
 
Another way to consider a CARDS loan is not as one 
transaction but as two closely related transactions: first, the 
purchase and exchange of the foreign currency (for which the 
taxpayer actually assumed liability, see supra note 8) and 
second, the agreement to be jointly and severally liable for the 
amount of the CARDS Loan in excess of that purchase.  
Focusing only on the second CARDS-related transaction, the 
basis is zero because that part of the transaction plainly lacks 
economic substance.  Therefore, the overstatement is the full 
amount of the basis attributable to that second transaction 
(again, in this case, the $7.6 million deduction disallowed by 
the Commissioner.)  Cf. Gustashaw, 696 F.3d at 1133 (noting 
that “a basis of zero ... is the correct amount when a 
transaction lacks economic substance”).   
                                                                                                     
property may be limited to its fair market value, rather than to 
the taxpayer‟s outlay, “where a transaction is not conducted 
on at arm‟s-length by two economically self-interested parties 
or where a transaction is based upon „peculiar circumstances‟ 
which influence the purchaser to agree to a price in excess of 
the property‟s fair market value.”  Lemmen v. Comm’r, 77 
T.C. 1326, 1348 (1981) (quoting Bixby v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 
757, 776 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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The amount of the valuation misstatement and of the 
deduction disallowed in this case are the same under either 
approach, and the explanation of the tax deficiency that the 
Commissioner sent to Murus alludes to both approaches.  
(See Supplemental App. at 135 (disallowing the $7.6 million 
deduction because the “transaction as a whole lacks economic 
substance”); id. at 125 (concluding that “the taxpayer‟s basis 
should be limited to the fair market value of the assets 
received rather than the full loan amount”)).  But the 
calculation of the percentage overstatement is not the same – 
$9.4 million divided by $1.8 million under the first approach, 
and $7.6 million divided by $0 under the second.  The latter 
calculation, of course, results in an undefined percentage 
overstatement which the Commissioner treats as meeting the 
400 percent threshold.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) 
(providing that the “adjusted basis claimed on a return of any 
property with a correct ...  adjusted basis of zero is considered 
to be 400 percent or more of the correct amount[] ... and the 
applicable penalty rate is 40 percent”).  For purposes of this 
case, then, either calculation yields an overstatement of more 
than 400 percent, so that the 40 percent penalty under I.R.C. 
§ 6662 applies.  Consequently, we need not, and do not, 
decide which is the correct or better approach, though we 
urge the Commissioner to clarify his interpretation of the law 
on this point. 
 
 In either case, because the underpayment in Crispin‟s 
taxes is directly traceable to the inflated basis in the loan 
assumption proceeds, that underpayment is “attributable to” a 
valuation misstatement of over 400 percent, and the 40 
percent penalty is applicable to Crispin‟s underpayment of his 
2001 taxes. 
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2. Reasonable Reliance on the Pullman 
 Opinion 
 
 I.R.C. § 6664(c) provides relief from the 
underpayment penalties in the form of a “reasonable cause 
exception” pursuant to which “[n]o penalty shall be imposed 
under section 6662 ... with respect to any portion of an 
underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause 
for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with 
respect to such portion.”  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).  “The 
determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable 
cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances.”  
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).  “Circumstances that may 
indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest 
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of 
all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, 
knowledge, and education of the taxpayer.”  Id. 
 
 The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate 
that there was nothing reasonable about Crispin‟s reliance on 
the Pullman Opinion to immunize him from the 
underpayment penalty.  Prior to Crispin‟s filing his 2001 tax 
return, the IRS, in its Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730 (Mar. 
18, 2002), told taxpayers that losses on CARDS transactions 
could not be deducted from ordinary income.  The Pullman 
Opinion specifically referred to Notice 2002-21 and advised 
Crispin that the IRS had “concluded that no loss was 
allowable in the circumstances described therein ... .”  
(Supplemental App. at 82; see also id. at 83 (advising Crispin 
that Notice 2002-21 designated CARDS as “listed 
transactions” on which “the Service may impose various 
penalties”).)  Crispin‟s “experience, knowledge, and 
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education,” see Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1), as a former 
CPA and chief financial officer  also strongly suggest enough 
familiarity with tax matters that he should be expected to 
have understood the warnings that Pullman  included in the 
opinion.
20
  
 
 Furthermore, “[w]hile it is true that actual reliance on 
the tax advice of an independent, competent professional may 
negate a finding of negligence [for purposes of § 6662], the 
reliance itself must be objectively reasonable in the sense that 
the taxpayer supplied the professional with all the necessary 
information to assess the tax matter ... .”  Neonatology 
Assocs., 299 F.3d at 234.  In particular, the advice on which 
the taxpayer claims reasonable reliance must not be based on 
an “inaccurate representation or assumption as to the 
taxpayer‟s purposes for entering into a transaction or for 
structuring a transaction in a particular manner.”  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii).   That standard is not met here because, 
as the Pullman Opinion itself makes clear, Pullman based its 
opinion on a series of misrepresentations by Crispin.   
 
For example, Crispin represented to Pullman that the 
business purpose of the transaction was to reduce borrowing 
costs and to afford Crispin “the ability to have access to large 
amounts of capital on a long-term basis to operate the 
                                              
20
 Litigation in which Crispin was involved prior to the 
current lawsuit also indicates that Crispin is knowledgeable 
about tax matters generally and about tax shelters in 
particular.  See CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 701 (2005) (disallowing most of the deductions 
associated with a tax shelter used by Crispin in the early 
1990‟s).    
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business of Murus.” (Supplemental App. at 87.)  However, 
Crispin knew or should have known that that representation 
was false, given that aircraft were not approved as collateral, 
which would have been necessary for Murus to make use of 
the CARDS Loan, and further given that the loan was in 
essence a one-year revolving credit facility callable at any 
time after the first year.  Crispin also represented to Pullman 
that “[n]either Chenery nor any other party provided any tax 
related promotional material to [him] prior to [his] entering 
into” the CARDS transaction.  (Supplemental App. at 79.)  
But Chenery founder Hahn had presented a CARDS 
transaction proposal to Crispin that included promotional 
materials describing the associated tax benefits, as well as a 
sample tax opinion.  When a taxpayer relies on advice that is 
based on the taxpayer‟s own misrepresentations, that reliance 
is neither reasonable nor in good faith.
21
  See Treas. Reg. § 
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 The Tax Court also found that “the record does not 
reflect that petitioner actually relied on the tax opinion” 
because “[Crispin] received the finalized opinion after the 
2001 tax returns for [Crispin] and Murus were filed.”  (App. 
at 33.) Crispin points out that, although the final Pullman 
Opinion was dated April 29, 2002 (two weeks after he had 
filed his 2001 returns), the stipulated record contains an 
April 12, 2002 engagement letter to which a draft opinion 
letter had been attached, with the understanding that the final 
letter would be backdated to April 12.  The Tax Court 
concluded that, because no draft of the Pullman Opinion was 
in the record, Crispin could not show that the factual 
assumptions and analysis in the draft on which Crispin claims 
reliance were the same as those in the final Pullman Opinion.  
Because we conclude that Crispin‟s reliance on the Pullman 
Opinion was neither reasonable nor in good faith, we need not 
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1.6664-4(b)(1) (“Reliance ... on the advice of a professional 
tax advisor or an appraiser does not necessarily demonstrate 
reasonable cause and good faith.”). 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 “When, as here, a taxpayer is presented with what 
would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax 
obligations, he should recognize that he proceeds at his own 
peril.”  Neonatology Assocs., 299 F.3d at 234.  Crispin 
gambled at CARDS and lost, and he is liable for both the 
underpayment of his taxes and the accuracy-related penalty as 
determined by the Commissioner. 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the Tax 
Court. 
 
                                                                                                     
address this issue. 
